This paper investigates the impact of macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions on the 10-year government bond spreads for Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain with respect to Germany. Using a unique tick-by-tick dataset over 1/02/2009-05/31/2012, we identify the impact of the three drivers via jump and cojump detection procedures. Disentangling the pre-from the post-announcement effects, real economy and forward looking news releases from US and Euro area, country specific Spanish and German macroannouncements, and auctions hold in distressed countries such Italy and Spain have a statistically and economically significant effect.
crisis involving, although at different extents, all the peripheral countries have questioned the much celebrated markets' self-regulatory power as well as the ability of policy makers and regulators to 10 adopt stability measures and stimulate economic growth. Thus, understanding which factors drive sovereign risk is particularly timely also for the macroeconomic consequences of the comovements associated to these factors. For instance, higher spreads deteriorate borrowing capabilities and market confidence which simultaneously impact on consumption and investment. The way to ameliorate the effects of the crisis on the real economy is a current political debate but the recipes 15 to be put in place still need to be fully understood.
In this paper, we identify the role that market movers like macroeconomic announcements, government bond auctions and rating actions have in driving government bond markets, and whether the occurrence of specific events in a country affects other European countries. To this aim, we make use of a unique dataset of high frequency data on 10-year European government bond spreads. 20 Moreover, we analyze the impact of the three drivers on both conditional mean and variance specifications, disentangling the pre-from the post-announcement effect. The econometric analysis is conducted using recent developments in the financial econometrics literature on jump and cojump detection procedures.
In the literature, the relationship between macroannouncements and returns is widely studied 25 while the sensitivity of jumps is analyzed in a handful of papers such as [1] , [2] and [3] . In particular, [2] estimate jumps and cojumps at intradaily frequency mapping them to macro news to find that bond markets are the most sensitive to news releases and that macroannouncement surprises are associated with cojumps even more consistently than jumps. [2] point out the advantage of using very high frequency data to study the impact of such events. On the other hand, [3] conclude 30 that although a majority of jumps occurs at prescheduled news announcement times, surprises related to macroannouncements have limited power in explaining bond price jumps. Moreover, authors show that liquidity shocks play a key role in explaining jumps and that usually, during the preannouncement period, it is possible to observe a drop in market depth. [3] explain this result as that, as also discussed in [4] , dealers tend to withdraw orders and place them further out to avoid 35 being picked off in the upcoming information event. Thus, authors conclude that jumps observed in correspondence to macroannouncement releases are not only determined by news, but also by the drop in liquidity that is a market mover per se.
As far as government bond auctions are concerned, we refer to [5] where the impact of US treasury auctions on returns is assessed. [5] compute the "surprise" effect as the difference between 40 the yield in the when-issued market with the actual ex-post yield without relevant findings.
Finally, although rating actions are expected to be an important determinant of spreads, as creditworthiness represents the long-term sustainability of countries' debt, the role and reliability of credit rating agencies (CRA) has been under investigation. In addition to concerns on CRAs effective capability to give accurate risk assessments, there is a sustained debate about the timing 1. Data Description
Spreads
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We use data for the benchmark 10-year government bonds of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain over the period 2nd January 2009 -31st May 2012. We consider bid, rather than mid, data as more representative of the spreads during crisis periods considering the widening of bid-ask spreads witnessed by bond markets. The 10-year bond benchmarks are identified according to maturity and liquidity criteria. Morningstar provided us with this unique tick-by-tick 85 data sample that we resampled at 5-minute frequency using previous tick scheme and calendar time, excluding time intervals with missing values for at least one country. The 5-minute frequency is robust to microstructure noise and offers sufficiently high frequency information to properly evaluate the impact of specific events. Moreover, this frequency is consistent with previous seminal contributions such as [5] and [13] .
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The trading period considered is 8 a.m. -3:30 p.m. coordinated universal time (UTC). We remove holidays and detect and remove outliers by applying a filter which is a modification of the procedure proposed in [14] , implemented following the steps suggested by [15] ( p. 156). We summarize the procedure below.
Let p t,i be a tick-by-tick time series of log-prices, where t denotes day and i the time interval of day t, then an observation is removed if:
where k is the bandwidth, p t,i k L and p t,i k R are sample medians of the k/2 observations 95 respectively before (L for left) and after (R for right) (t, i), M D t,i (k) is the mean absolute deviation from the median of the whole neighborhood of length k, ∧ is the intersection operator, γ is the granularity parameter and it is computed as the mean of the kabsolute returns and n is γ−multiplier.
k and n are set equal to 20 and 10 respectively, in order to ensure that the neighborhood of ticks does not get too wide and that the threshold to identify outliers is reasonable.
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The advantage of this rule lies in the separate comparison of the (t, i) −th trade against the left and right neighbors while the measure of dispersion is calculated on the whole bunch of k trades.
This approach is specifically designed to avoid detecting jumps as false outliers.
Finally, we also remove the first return of the day that occurs at 8 a.m. as it largely reflects the adjustment to information accumulated overnight and hence exhibits a spurious excess variability 105 compared to any other five-minute intervals. Data selecting procedure is summarized in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 somewhere here]
In Panel A, for each time series, we report the overall number of ticks available from which we remove holidays, weekends and trades occurred outside the trading period 8 a.m. Figure 1 .
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[Insert Figure 1 somewhere here]
Government bond spreads were moving very closely until May 2010, when markets start to pay more attention to sovereign debt risk in correspondence to the burst of Greek crisis. In May 2010, Greek government deficit was revised and estimated to be 13.6% of GDP with a correspondent decrease in international confidence in Greece's ability to repay its sovereign debt. As consequence,
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despite the first rescue package approved by Eurozone countries and the IMF, concerns about Euro countries solvability began to raise together with spreads.
In Panel B of Table 1 , we report the analysis of the trading activity around the public events we are taking into consideration namely macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions. The time window analyzed ranges from 1 hour before up to 1 hour after the release of 135 each event. We compare both the number of trades per hour as well the time elapsed between two consecutive trades with respect to trading hours with no particular events. There is no evidence of a different trading activity around the events analyzed.
Macroannouncements
As far as macroannouncements, we consider news releases related to the US, the Euro area,
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Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In some cases, we are unable to use all the available macroannouncements as they are released when some markets are still closed. This is for instance the case of France, with releases occurring between 6:30 and 7:45 a.m. UTC. Finally, in case of Spain, although macroannouncements are released at 8:00 a.m.
5
UTC, we keep these indicators shifting them to 8:05 a.m. in order to match with spreads data.
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Data related to macroannouncements are median expected value by survey panelists (E), forecasts standard deviation (σ) and actual value of the release (A) and they were collected from Bloomberg.
A complete list of analyzed macroannouncements is presented in Table 2 where we report even details on surprises, defined as S = (A − E)/σ.
[Insert Table 2 somewhere here]
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The size of the surprises related to US and Euro area macroannouncements are smaller than those concerning individual countries, implying a more accurate forecast by surveyors in the first two cases, though it is fair to mention that the number of surveyors interviewed for US and Euro area releases is higher than for individual countries. Finally, we drop the France industrial production given that in only two cases macroannouncements were released after 8 a.m. UTC, and the Portugal 155 preliminary GDP because of its very high dispersion (standard deviation equals 10.7) due to both poor forecasts and low number of surveyors for this specific news.
Bond Auctions
We take into consideration auctions of European countries issuing Euro-denominated bonds:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
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Most auctions take place between 8 and 10 a.m. UTC. To capture the performance of an auction, we use two main variables: the average yield at which the government sells the bonds and the bid-to-cover, that is how many bids the Government received with respect to the total offer. These two data were collected just for auctions relative to 10-year bonds as they not only correspond to the maturity of the spreads analyzed but they even represent the most relevant ones.
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In Table 3 , we report the total number of auctions per country together with the detail of 10-year bond auctions for which we provide mean and standard deviation of average yield and bid-to-cover.
[Insert Table 3 somewhere here]
Bid-to-covers are very similar for all the countries analyzed ranging from a minimum of 1.42
for Italian auctions to a maximum of 2.34 for French ones, while average yields reflect countries 170 different sovereign risk: safer countries such as Finland and Germany succeed in selling bonds at higher prices and lower returns, with an average yield of 2.75% and 3.04% respectively, while riskier countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal allocate their bonds at an average yield of 4.76%, 4.85% and 5.01%, respectively.
Rating Actions
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We collect data concerning rating actions from the three main rating agencies: Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch. The aim is not only to assess whether downgradings have an impact on 6 government bond spreads but also to investigate whether some agencies have bigger and/or more lagged impacts. Note that in our sample, we deal mainly with downgrading actions as only two upgrading actions occurred during the period considered, namely on 22nd February 2011 and 13th
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March 2012 for Greece. Downgrading actions were taken against Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain as reported in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 somewhere here]
Econometric Identification and Modelling of Jumps and Cojumps
Identifying Jumps and Cojumps
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We briefly describe the testing procedures implemented to identify jumps and cojumps.
Detecting Jumps
As we are interested in identifying the exact time of occurrence of jumps, the [16] 
where |r t,i | is the absolute value of return on day t and time-interval i defined as p t,i −p t,i−1 and σ t is the bipower volatility of day t. [19] show that the filtered jump test statistics increases the accuracy of intraday jump detection methods. To obtain an estimate of the periodicity component s t,i ,
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we implement the [19] robust estimation technique based on the Truncated Maximum Likelihood (TML) estimator. The parametric specification we adopt for s t,i is similar to the one proposed by [20] but here we include even government bond auctions and rating actions as follows:
1 [18] report a comprehensive comparison between the alternative testing procedures to detect jumps.
where N represents the number of intraday intervals i belonging to day t; N 1 = (N +1)/2 and N 2 =
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(N + 1)(N + 2)/6 are normalizing constants; S j t,i is the surprise for macroannouncements and government bond auctions (for the last ones, surprises are computed as the difference in bidto-cover between current and previous 10-year auction); J is the sum of macroannouncements and auctions considered; R b t,i represents a dummy variable for rating action undertaken by rating agency b; B is the number of rating agencies; λ j and φ b are event specific loading coefficients; P is 200 a tuning parameter determining the order of the expansion of the sinusoids;θ T M L is full parameter vector to be estimated; x t,i denotes the entire set of explanatory variables. Moreover, the loading coefficients λ j and φ b are modeled applying the AndersenBollerslev1998 decay-structure which allows the specific event to impact over a time window with decaying weights. Macroannouncement surprises are allowed to impact starting from 30 minutes before the release up to one hour and 205 30 minutes after, as in [20] . As far as government bond auctions are concerned, we use a wider window, ranging from two hours before the auction ends up to one hour after it as we want to take into account markets uncertainty during the auction period. Finally, as the timing of rating actions is unforeseeable, we set the start of the window in correspondence to the rating action up to two hours after it. 
Detecting Cojumps
In order to evaluate markets interdependence, we assess whether they share a simultaneous jump, that is whether there is evidence of a cojump. To identify cojumps, we adopt the definition proposed in [2] . Given C assets, the contemporaneous cojump is defined as:
where I(.) is the indicator function taking value 1 in case on day t at the interval i there was a significant jump F J t,i . In order to identify a sufficient number of cojumps for further analysis, we define a cojump if two or more jumps occur within a 15 minutes time window.
Modelling Jumps and Cojumps
Mapping Jumps
We now turn to assess the linkage between jumps and their possible determinants, namely macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions. To this purpose, we compare the number of jumps around a pre-specified event with respect to other periods as it is discussed later in the paper. However, this simple comparison does not take into account either other variables 220 which could cause the observed difference going beyond the impact of the single event or the concurrence with other news. Moreover, it is widely documented (see for instance [13] ; [21] ; [22] that it is not the release per se which explains jumps, as the surprise related to a particular event;
in the case of government bond auctions, we define the surprise as the difference in the bid-tocover and the average yield with the previous auction of bond of the same maturity. When the 225 release is within market expectation, there is no reason for market to jump after the announcement.
Moreover, when two releases occur simultaneously, the only way to impute the impact to the correct release is to use surprise.
The econometric model we propose is able to map jumps to macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions in both the process governing the conditional mean and the conditional variance of government bond spreads. With respect to the conditional mean, we extend the Tobit-GARCH model in [2] :
where |F J t,i | is the absolute size of significant detected jumps; η t,i is the linear combination of dayof-the-week dummies; µ t,i is the standardized US news surprises periodic component and N the number of intraday periods within a day. [2] allow for a potential delayed response to news by testing for lagged news; moreover they correct for heteroskedasticity estimating the Tobit-GARCH model of [23] .
With respect to the conditional variance, rather than a simple GARCH model as in [2] , we use a GARCH formulation driven by macroannouncements quite similar to the one adopted in [24] :
where macroannouncements impact in three alternative ways. First, ω 2 allows for the unconditional volatility level to differ from ω 1 when an announcement D t,i−1 is scheduled in the near future.
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This is the so-called pre-announcement effect and, if it is found to be positive, it implies a higher unconditional volatility level in the period preceding the releases. Second, the coefficient α 2 captures the difference in persistency of macroannouncements with respect to news with small surprise and 9 to other kind of news. In particular, D * t,i−1 are dummy variables taking value 1 in case the absolute size of the surprise is greater than its standard deviation and zero otherwise. If the parameters α 2 240 are found to be negative/positive and statistically significant, this means that macroannouncements bringing a big surprise are less/more persistent with respect to regular shocks. Finally, ν 2 accounts for a different leverage effect in correspondence to macroannouncements and, if it is found to be positive/negative, it implies that negative surprises have higher/lower impact than positive ones and that the leverage effect is more/less pronounced for macroannouncements with respect to news 245 with small surprise and to other kind of news.
Modelling Jumps
The jump model we estimate is a Tobit-GARCH where both the mean and variance processes are driven by macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions. In particular, we allow for a pre-announcement effect that takes into account future releases of macroannouncements 250 and government bond auctions for a pre-specified number of time intervals, while rating actions are excluded as they are not pre-scheduled. As per post-announcement, we consider surprise effects related to macroannouncements and auctions rather than simple dummy variables, the only exception being the rating actions which indeed enter the model by dummy variables taking value 1 after the rating action got public. Finally, another novelty in our model is that we allow the surprise 255 effect to impact for a pre-specified time window after the release; the surprise is in fact weighted by a polynomial decay structure as the one adopted in [20] for modelling intraday periodicity. [25] and [2] both account for delayed response of markets after an announcement but they enter their model with lags of the surprise, each loaded by its own coefficient, making the estimation procedure quite cumbersome. In our model instead we just need to estimate coefficients for decaying-weighted 
where |F J t,i | is the absolute size of significant detected jumps with α = 0.05 by the LM test filtered by the intraday periodicity estimated by (3) and (4) are dummy variables taking value 1 if a rating action was undertaken up to ∆ periods before (t, i);
The conditional volatility h t,i is specified as follows:
where D j τ denotes the dummy variable taking value 1 if a macroannouncement or an auction is scheduled to take place in the next ∆ periods after (t, i); D * j τ denotes the dummy variable taking value 1 for large macroannouncement surprises or big changes in bid-to-cover or average-yield occurred in the previous ∆ periods; R b τ denotes the dummy variable taking value 1 if in the previous ∆ periods a rating action occurred.
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Unlike [24] , we define large surprises if the absolute surprise is higher than one half of the standard deviation of this measure for all the macroannouncements of the same kind in order to set a unique rule for macroannouncements and bond auctions as, for auctions, we do not dispose of standard deviation of forecasts.
Modelling Cojumps
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We adopt a simple logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable: cojump occurrence vs. non occurrence 2 . The cojump model has the same specification adopted for jump mean in (8) although here surprises are loaded by unitary weights throughout the response window rather than by a specific weighting pattern. The cojumps are determined on the basis of jumps identified by the LM test filtered by the intraday periodicity as discussed in Section 2.1. Considering that although we are modeling the simple event, cojump vs no-cojump, the identified cojumps are very few and that logit model require at least 20% of events to get robust estimates (see for instance [26] , we proceed by oversampling and creating an artificial sample of size M with all the identified cojumps representing 20% of M while the other observations are chosen randomly. The procedure provides consistent and efficient estimates provided appropriate statistical corrections are implemented. To this purpose, we adopt a prior correction approach consisting in computing the usual logistic regression estimators corrected using prior information about the fraction of ones in the population, τ , and the observed fraction of ones in the sample, y. For the logit model, [26] show that the MLE β i estimator for the covariate in the subsample is a statistically consistent estimate of β i while the corrected estimate for the intercept β 0 is:
Empirical Findings
Preliminary Analysis
As first step in assessing the relationship between jumps and macroannouncements, bond auctions and rating actions, we compare jumps occurrence around a specific event with respect to other periods. We set the time window for the macroannouncement releases and government bond auc-285 tions ranging from 1 hour before up to 1 hour after the release while for rating actions, given that these events are not pre-scheduled as the other two are, the response window covers the two hours following the release. For the selection of the time windows, we refer to [27] , [28] and [29] who find that the stock price response essentially completes in the trading day and, more precisely, within one hour after the announcements 3 . Moreover, in order to properly set response time windows,
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we analyze the real behaviour of the absolute returns around the event specified. In Figures 2-3, we report the mean absolute returns around macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions together with the 95% confidence level, on the left, and the same statistics but for days with no event although around the typical hour of release on the right. We distinguish between US and Euro macroannouncements as the usual release time is between 13:30 and 15:00 UTC and 295 between 8:00 and 10:00 UTC respectively. On the x-axis we report the number of 5-minute intervals preceding/following the time of release. In Table 5 , we report statistics on detected jumps for each country and a comparison of jump occurrences during news with respect to no-news periods 4 .
[Insert Figures 2-3 and Table 5 somewhere here]
Overall, macroannouncements play an important role in explaining jumps in all countries. In particular, the biggest impact is due to US and Euro area releases while news concerning individual countries seem to play a minor role, with the most relevant ones being those on Germany, the In Table 6 , we report the analysis for cojumps identified using (5).
[Insert Table 6 limited impact that such kind of news have on government bond markets. Some evidences of a higher proportion of cojumps is found just with respect to actions undertaken against Italy, Greece and Spain, three of the GIIPS countries.
Results for the Jump Model
The first step to estimate the model for the absolute jump size in (8) Table 7 reports the results of mean equation in (8) . Tobit coefficients measure the impact of a change in the corresponding independent variable on the latent dependent variable weighted by the probability of being above the threshold. In our case, this corresponds to the probability of observing a jump. Due to space constraint, we only report variables significant for at least one of the countries under analysis.
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[Insert Table 7 somewhere here]
Results reported in Table 7 highlight the relevant role that macroannouncements and government bond auctions have in explaining jumps in government bond spreads. In particular both effects, pre-and post-announcement, turned out to be statistically significant. In addition to that, it is interesting to note that relevant news are not coming just from the US an the Euro area, but Entering now in details of results reported in Table 7 , we can infer that the pure knowledge about 
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Focusing on government bond auctions, we can see that in the time frame preceding the publication of auction results the probability of observing jumps increases. In particular this holds true with respect to auctions hold in Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain, namely the country with the strongest economy in Europe together with three of the European countries which suffered the most during the sovereign crisis. In addition to that, it is interesting to note that we observe 425 both a self-referencing effect, i.e. auctions hold in Italy and Spain impact on Italian and Spanish government bond spreads, as well as an outer effect, i.e. auctions hold in Greece determine a higher probability of observing jumps in French, Belgian and Dutch spreads and auctions hold in Italy on Spanish spreads. German auctions determine as well a self-referencing effect given that the dependent variable are spreads of 10-year benchmark bonds on German Bund.
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German auctions are very important market movers even in the period following the publication of auctions results. Differences in bid-to-cover of 10-year German auctions significantly explain jumps in all the countries analyzed. The bid-to-cover captures market demand of auctioned bonds with respect to the total offer and therefore it provides an indication about the market sentiment towards those bonds. In particular, if German bid-to-cover increases, that implies that investors 435 are switching their preferences towards German Bunds, acting during the sovereign crisis as a safe-heaven and denoting therefore an increasing risk aversion. Not only German bid-to-cover is statistically significant in explaining jumps in sovereign spreads, but even Belgian bid-to-cover, on Belgian spreads, and Spanish bid-to-cover, on Spanish spreads, confirming the existence of a strong self-referencing effect.
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In addition to changes in bid-to-cover, results indicate that even differences in average yield of current 10-year government bond auction with respect to the previous one contribute in explaining jumps in sovereign spreads. In particular, auctions on French government bonds determine sizable jumps in Italian and Spanish spreads while those on German bonds cause jumps on Italian, French and Spanish bonds. Finally, auctions hold in Italy impact on French, Belgian and Dutch spreads 445 and those in Spain just on Spanish spreads. Coherently with results on pre-announcement and bid-to-cover, we find that the auctions explaining jumps in government bond spreads are those hold in the most troubled countries during the sovereign crisis, namely Italy, Spain, and in the safest European country, i.e. Germany. In addition to that, we point out that auctions hold in these countries not only determine jumps in these countries, but even in other countries confirming the 450 existence of strong interlinkages among European countries.
Finally, there is no evidence that rating actions determine jumps in sovereign spreads. Our results contrast with findings in the literature assessing the impact of rating actions on returns or jumps. [34] discuss that the most of the incremental information value is transmitted through negative credit warnings (i.e., "outlooks," "reviews," and "watches,"), rather than actual rating 455 changes. The same conclusion is also reported in [35] , [36] and [12] . Our analysis confirms instead a reputation issue attached to rating agencies: market participants do not rely on rating agencies assessment in default risks in government bonds. This result can be read in light of the role they played in the subprime crisis, provided they did not provide investors with reliable assessment of the risk of structured products on US mortgage loans. Table 8 reports the results of variance equation (9). Again, due to space constraint, we only report variables significant for at least one of the countries under analysis.
Variance Equation
[Insert Table 8 somewhere here]
The coefficients ω 2,j , j = 1, ..., J account for a different level of unconditional volatility in 465 correspondence to the future macroannouncement or government bond auction releases with respect to time intervals not preceding any news. Those coefficients take a positive sign and are statistically significant, suggesting that in the hour preceding one of the events in our analysis, the level of volatility raises above the level ω 1 . In particular, 10 macroannouncements out of 55 are statistically different from zero. The most relevant news are those concerning US, with non-farm payroll playing 470 its usual leading role and being significant for all the sovereign spreads but Belgian, together with another real economy news, GDP final, determining sizable jumps for Italy, France and Belgium.
Among Euro area related news, a great attention is devoted to the forthcoming reading of the Introductory Statement, being statistically significant for all the government spreads, but Italian, and of the PMI flash for French and Belgian spreads. Moreover we found that the level of volatility 475 raises just before the release of German ZEW, being statistically significant for France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and Italian industrial production and Spanish unemployment, just impacting Italy and Spain respectively.
Turning now the attention to auctions, we found some evidence of a raise in volatility in correspondence of prescheduled auctions, in particular those hold in Greece and Italy.
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All variables used so far capture the pre-announcement effect. Once information is released, traders process information and adjust the price according. Parameters α 2,j , j = 1, ..., J +B account for persistency of the surprise effect, once news has been released, while parameters ν 2,j allow for the different leverage effect in correspondence to negative surprise lead by macroannouncements with respect to news with no or little surprise and to other negative news.
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As far as the persistency parameters are concerned, starting from macroannouncements we find that 14 of them are statistically significant indicating that actually, macroannouncements bringing a great surprise have a different level of persistency with respect to other news. In particular, given that almost all the significant coefficients take a positive sign, we can conclude that macroannouncements have a higher persistency. Focusing on the country and category of macroannouncements, 490 we see that as usual those related to US and Euro area play a major role, with higher relevance of real economy and forward looking indicators. For instance, one of the most important driver is US non-farm payroll, US GDP final, Euro area Introductory statement and Euro area PMI final. The persistency of the ECB Introductory Statement can be explained in light of the great amount of information that it conveys which can take some time to be completely incorporated by the market.
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Moreover, the reading of the Introductory Statement per se together with the time devoted to questions and answers may take some time to be carried out. In addition, individual countries releases with high persistency are German unemployment, Italian GDP final, Spanish unemployment and industrial production, and Belgian business confidence.
It is interesting to see that news determining sizeable jumps in government bond spreads are 500 even those which persist the most. Even with respect to government bond auctions, those with a higher persistency are hold in Italy, Spain and Belgium, confirming results highlighted previously in the paper.
Finally, let us take a look at the asymmetric effect. In particular, as far as both macroannouncements and auctions are concerned, coefficients are positive and statistically significant implying that 505 the leverage effect associated to these events, with a big surprise, is more pronounced than same kind of news but with smaller surprises or with respect to other kind of news. We like to interpret this finding given the high attention that these news deserve from markets, implying that a huge number of traders and portfolio managers take their decisions on these kind of releases. The evidence of the higher leverage effect associated to macroannouncements with respect to other kind of 510 news is also coherent with findings in [24] .
Focusing on countries and categories of announcements determining a higher leverage effect, we confirm results reported earlier in the paper. In particular, releases impacting the most belong to real economy and forward looking categories, and concern mostly the US and Euro area, although a number of releases on individual countries are statistically significant as well. As per government 515 bond auctions, the most relevant are still those hold in Italy and Spain.
Results for the Cojump Model
In this final section, we report the results from model estimation for cojumps.
First, in order to get robust estimates, we remove all the dummy variables which had less than 15 observations for all the possible combinations with the dependent variable in a 2x2 contingency 520 table; on the remaining variables we then estimate the logit model and adjust the estimates according to prior correction. In Table 9 , we report only statistically significant variables explaining cojumps:
[Insert Table 9 somewhere here] Results in Table 9 suggest that both pre-and post-announcement effects are statistically sig-525 nificant in explaining cojump occurrences.
As per macroannouncements, news related to US real economy play a prominent role, with non-farm payroll, GDP and retail sales. The relevance of US non-farm payroll and retail sales in explaining cojumps is also stated in [2] . Focusing on Euro are releases, we find confirmation of the importance of the Introductory Statement, entering the model with both pre-and post-effects, 
Conclusions
In this paper, we jointly modeled the impact of macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions on the 10-year government bond spreads for the benchmarks of Belgium, France, To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper assessing in a comprehensive way the drivers of jumps and cojumps associated to government bond spreads. Our framework allows to consider 565 simultaneously a relevant number of variables which is crucial in order to properly measure the impact of these events; this is important also because macroannouncements in the Euro area and government bond auctions take place at almost the same time. Finally, the evaluation of the impact of auctions on spreads is relevant also to practitioners for determining their trading and asset allocation strategies.
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There are important policy implications from our analysis. We showed that movements in government bond spreads are significantly determined by macroannouncements and government bond auctions, and thus in the recent sovereign crisis intraday movements were driven by changes in macroeconomic fundamentals and not, or at least not only, by speculative actions. In addition, the fact that events taking place in some individual countries, such as Germany and Spain for 575 macroannouncements and Germany, Italy and Spain for auctions, have a significant impact in other countries, shows the great level of interdependence existing among European countries.
The findings in this paper suggest interesting additional developments. Our analysis is very comprehensive about the possible determinants of jumps and cojumps, however we envisage that at 20 least three other possible drivers may play an important role in an uncertain and volatile environ-580 ment as the one that has been characterizing markets in the most recent years. In this paper, we analyzed the impact of downgrading actions once the decision of the rating agency becomes public:
it will be interesting to study whether warnings and outlook changes announced by rating agencies could have some impact on government bond spreads. The second issue deals with the analysis of market's reactions to political events. For instance, the inconclusive results of Italian elections 585 of the 25th February 2012 brought on the market a high level of uncertainty which determined a substantial increase in Italian government bond spread of 51 bps in just one day and which affected even Spanish spread with an increase of 30 bps. The last factor, that will deserve an entire research project, are policy announcements from central banks, considered for instance the great impact that Mario Draghi's whatever it takes had on government bonds. Finally, following [37] who look 590 at announcement effects in the real and nominal US Treasury market using real yields, nominal yields, and the spread between the two, we may also look at yields on the German Bund, yields on the other bonds, and the spreads between them. This is part of an ongoing research agenda. The left-hand column of the figure reports the plots of the mean absolute returns with the 95% confidence interval around the government bond auctions and rating actions. The right-hand column of figure plots the mean absolute returns around the typical average release time of the news: 9:00 UTC for government bond auctions and 8:00 UTC for rating actions. On the x-axis, we report the number of 5-minute intervals preceding/following the time of the release. (1) in the text. Tick-by-tick data are resampled using calendar time (see details in the body of the paper). The 1st observation of each day is removed as it presents excess volatility. In square brackets is the unit of measurement. PANEL B of the table reports the analysis of trading activity around the three categories of events analyzed: macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions. The window around the event ranges from 1 hour before the release up to 1 hour after. The table reports a description of government bond auctions hold in the period 2nd Janaury 2009 -31st May 2012. Average yield: yield at which the government allocated the bonds issued in an auction. Bid-to-cover: ratio between the number of bids the Government received and the amount of bonds offered. Average yield and bid-to-cover are collected just for auctions concerning 10-year bonds. Boudt et al. (2011) , defined in (3) and (4), at the 5% significance level as well as the average absolute size of jumps. Panels B-D of the table report a preliminary analysis of the degree of association between jumps and macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions by applying the z-test to compare the frequency of jumps occurrence around the event in analysis with respect to no-event situation. The null hypothesis is that the two percentages are equal. As per macroannouncements, we just show the analysis according to the classification in real economy, forward looking and price releases as reported in Table II while for government bond auctions, we report only relevant countries. In case one of the two categories has less than 10 observations, the test statistic is not reported (na). ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Boudt et al. (2011) , defined in (3) and (4), at the 5% significance level. Moreover, in order to identify a sufficient number of cojumps for further analysis, we define a cojump if two or more jumps occured in a 15-minute time window. P(Cojump-Jump) denotes the probability of a cojump given that at least one of the country had a jump. Panels B-C of the table report a preliminary analysis of the degree of association between cojumps and macroannouncements and government bond auctions by applying the z-test to compare the frequency of cojumps occurrence around the event in analysis with respect to no-event.
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The null hypothesis is that the two percentages are equal. We did not report tests for rating actions as we observe a very low number of cojumps around rating actions which did not allow us to carry out the tests. In case one of the two categories has less than 10 observations, the test statistic is not reported (na). As per macroannouncements, we just show the analysis according to the classification in real economy, forward looking and price releases as reported in Table II while for government bond auctions, we report only relevant countries. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. (3) and (4). Macroannouncements and auctions pre-release are dummy variables taking value equal to 1 for time intervals preceding the release up to 1 hour before. Macroannouncements and auctions post-release effect is captured by the absolute size of surprise associated to the specific release. For bond auctions we define surprise as the difference in average yield and bid-to-cover with respect to the previous auction. These "surprises" are available just for 10-year bond auctions. Surprises are loaded by specifc polynomial which have a decay structure as proposed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) up to 1 hour after the release. Rating actions are dummy variables taking value 1 for time intervals following the action up to 2 hours after the release, zero otherwise. We report just variables which are significant at 10% level for at least one country. In some cases estimates are missing because the correspondent dependent variable was not selected in the pre-selection procedure described in Section 4.2. Estimates for the periodic component ξ are not reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. (3) and (4). Macroannouncements and auctions pre-release are dummy variables taking value equal to 1 for time intervals preceding the release up to 1 hour before the release. Macroannouncements and auctions post-release effect is captured by dummy variables equal to 1 for large surprise. Large surprises are defined as: -Surprise-≥0.5 SD(Surprise). For bond auctions we define surprise as the difference in average yield and bid-to-cover with respect to the previous auction. These "surprises" are available just for 10-year bond auctions. Surprises are evaluated up to 1 hour after the release. Rating actions are dummy variables taking value 1 for time intervals following the action up to 2 hours after the release, zero otherwise. Macroannouncements and auctions post-release -Asymmetric and Rating actions -Asymmetric are defined as for Macroannouncements and auctions post-release. We report just variables which are statistically significant at 10% level for at least one Country. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
